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Abstract
Recent human capital theories predict that labor market frictions and product market com-
petition inﬂuence ﬁrm-sponsored training. Using matched worker-ﬁrm data from Dutch
manufacturing, our paper empirically assesses the validity of these predictions. We ﬁnd
that a decrease in labor market frictions signiﬁcantly reduces ﬁrms’ training expenditures.
Instead, product market competition does not have an effect on ﬁrm-sponsored training.
We conclude that increasing competition through international integration and globaliza-
tion does not pose a threat to investments in on-the-job training. An increase in labor
market ﬂexibility may reduce incentives of ﬁrms to invest in training, but the magnitude of
this effect is small.
Keywords: ﬁrm-sponsored training, labor market frictions, product market competition,
matched worker-ﬁrm data.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: D43, J24, J42, L22, M53
We acknowledge ﬁnancial support for this research by Stichting Instituut GAK, through Reﬂect, the Research Institute for
Flexicurity, Labor Market Dynamics and Social Cohesion at Tilburg University. The estimates in this paper are based on
own calculations using various micro datasets made available through a remote access facility by Statistics Netherlands.
Corresponding author. Department of Economics, Tilburg University, PO BOX 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The
Netherlands; Tel: +31 13 4662534; Fax: +31 13 4663042; m.picchio@uvt.nl; IZA.
yDepartment of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands; Department of Economics, Uni-
versity of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia; IZA and CEPR; vanours@uvt.nl.1 Introduction
On-the-job training of employed workers is important because a high-skilled labor force stimu-
lates economic growth and facilitates sectoral adjustment of the economic structure. To the ex-
tentthatinvestmentsintrainingofworkersaregoodforlabormarketperformanceandeconomic
growth, it is relevant to understand the main determinants of these investments. Firm-speciﬁc
characteristics will inﬂuence training investments as ﬁrms may differ in their propensity to hire
less skilled workers and invest in training of these workers or to hire more skilled workers and
provide less training. And, there are also common determinants of ﬁrm-sponsored training re-
lated to market imperfections. An increase in competitiveness of the product market may affect
training investments while more ﬂexible labor market will also reduce investments in training.
Our paper focuses on the effects of labor market imperfections and product market com-
petition on training. From a theoretical point of view the effect of market imperfections can
go either way. More competition in the product market may reduce training because proﬁts
and investment funds go down, but it may also increase training if a better skilled workforce
makes the ﬁrm more able to compete with other ﬁrms. Similarly, the effect of labor market
competition can go either way. A higher labor mobility may increase the need for training but
may at the same time reduce the willingness of ﬁrms to make the investment in training because
with a shorter job tenure the pay-back period is reduced. If market imperfections inﬂuence
ﬁrm-sponsored training, training subsidies or regulation may be justiﬁed on the basis of well-
founded arguments. Firm-sponsored training stimulates human capital accumulation and thus
has a positive impact on productivity.
As discussed in more detail in the next section, previous empirical research on ﬁrm-sponso-
red training focuses on the effects on wages and productivity. So far, the effects of institutions,
including labor market frictions and product market competition, have not received a lot of
attention. Yet, in a changing economic environment in which labor markets have a tendency
to become more ﬂexible and product markets have a tendency to become more competitive
through a process of international integration and globalization, these relationships are very
policy relevant. Our paper focuses on the question how ﬁrm-sponsored training is inﬂuenced
by labor market frictions and product market competition.
Our empirical analysis is based on Dutch matched worker-ﬁrm data. The worker data are in-
formative on individual wages and labor market transitions by which we estimate the degree of
labor market frictions. The ﬁrm data are informative on ﬁrms’ revenues and costs by which we
estimate a product market power index. The estimation strategy to identify the impact of these
indexes on ﬁrm-sponsored training exploits their variation across markets and over time. We use
econometric techniques that control for ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity and we perform robust-
ness check to test whether the results might be biased by too strict parametric assumptions. We
ﬁnd that a decrease in labor market frictions signiﬁcantly reduces ﬁrms’ training expenditures.
Instead, product market competition does not have an effect on ﬁrm-sponsored training. From
2this we conclude that competition policy and increasing international competition will not pose
adverse effects on ﬁrm-sponsored training of workers. An increase in labor market ﬂexibility
will lead to a lower training incidence. However, the size of this effect is rather small compared
to the cross-sectional variation in the incidence of training.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. The data are
described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the indexes of market imperfections we use to test
non-competitive training theories. The econometric model and estimation results are presented
and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous studies
Becker’s (1962) seminal paper on investment in human capital distinguishes two types of on-
the-job training: speciﬁc and general. The former is useful only with the current employer,
whereasthelattercanbeexploitedalsowithotheremployers. Undertheassumptionofperfectly
competitive labor and product markets, Becker (1962, 1964) shows that ﬁrms are unwilling
to ﬁnance general training. Indeed, since workers are perfectly mobile and general human
capital increases workers’ productivity even at other employers, the current employer investing
in general training will not be able to reap any of the future rents. Since workers have the right
incentive to invest in their own general training, they will pay the cost and choose the ﬁrst-best
level of training.
There is however empirical evidence emphasizing that, although many training programs
are general (Harhoff and Kane, 1997; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a; Loewenstein and Spletzer,
1999), employers sponsor them (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998; Barron et al., 1999; Green et
al., 2000; Autor, 2001; Booth and Bryan, 2005). Hence, why do ﬁrms bear most of the costs
of training? This question has inspired new theoretical models of training that depart from the
Beckerian assumption of perfectly competitive markets. As originally pointed out by Becker
(1962) and then by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a,b), in case of labor market imperfections all
the forms of training might be turned into being de facto speciﬁc. In words, as soon as ﬁrms
have, for instance, some oligopsonistic power, workers are not paid their full marginal product
when they change job and current employers can reap some rents. If training raises workers’
productivity by more than wages (wage compression), employers have incentives to sponsor
general training because it is proﬁtable to do so.
Non-competitive theories of training have highlighted different sources of labor market im-
perfections leading to wage compression and ﬁrm-sponsored training.1 First, there might be
search frictions, so that it is difﬁcult for workers to quit and ﬁnd a new suitable job (Acemoglu,
1997).2 If an employee takes time to ﬁnd a new job that rewards her general training, the current
1See Leuven (2005) for a detailed survey of the theoretical sources of imperfect competition leading to wage
compression and ﬁrm-sponsored training.
2See also Shintoyo (2008) for a search and matching model with ﬁrms that create job vacancies and are willing
3employer can momentarily extract rents from the worker and recoup the training investment. A
second source of labor market imperfections is the presence of asymmetric information be-
tween the current employer of the worker and other ﬁrms. The information asymmetries might
be about the amount of training the worker has acquired with the current employer (Katz and Zi-
derman, 1990; Chang and Wang, 1996) and/or about workers’ ability (Chang and Wang, 1995;
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). Potential future employers might be unwilling to pay workers
for ex ante unveriﬁable productivity. This generates ex post informational monopsony power
and makes it proﬁtable for the current employer to sponsor general training. According to Man-
ning (2003) a perfectly competitive labor market is likely to deliver an efﬁcient level of training
as no potential future employers of a worker can expect to make proﬁts on them. However, also
a very monopsonistic labor market will deliver an efﬁcient level of training as there are few
future employers to make proﬁts out of the trained worker. Stevens (2001) indicates two main
theoretical reasons for failure in the training market. The ﬁrst is the limited access to capital
markets which prohibits workers to borrow against human capital. The reason for market failure
is imperfect competition in the labor market which may lead to underinvestment.
Firm-sponsored training may also be inﬂuenced by competition in the product market.
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2006) designed a model characterized by a three-stage game and
oligopolistic product market competition. In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms decide how many workers are
to be trained. In the second stage ﬁrms make wage offers to trained employees and workers
accept the best offer. In the last stage, ﬁrms engage in oligopolistic product market competition.
Under the assumption that training increases employees’ productivity, an additional trained
worker in the own ﬁrm increases the own productivity and weakens the competitor. Consid-
ering that a reduction in training activities results in an increase in trained workers’ wages,
ﬁrm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium outcome since ﬁrms prefer to train workers to
keep lower ex-post wages, rather than paying higher wages to poach them from the competitors.
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2006) argue that the softer the competition, the higher the training
incentives since poaching is more costly. However, Brunello and De Paola (2008) show that the
relationship between product market competition and training can be ambiguous: if an increase
in competition affects the proximity of workers and ﬁrms, the negative effect of poaching on
training can be compensated by positive local agglomeration effects.
Few studies have attempted to directly test the predictions of non-competitive models of
training. Autor (2001) focuses on temporary help supply ﬁrms in the US, ﬁnding that ﬁrm-
provided training increases with product market competition. Bassanini and Brunello (2010)
examine 15 European countries and 12 industries ﬁnding that an increase in product market
deregulation generates a sizeable increase in training incidence. Görlitz and Stiebale (2008)
ﬁnd instead no signiﬁcant effect of competition measures on training in Germany. Muehlemann
and Wolter (2007) and Muehlemann (2008) ﬁnd that Swiss ﬁrms are less likely to provide
apprenticeship training in dense regional labor markets, where the probability that workers are
to sponsor general training.
4poached by other ﬁrms is higher. Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) ﬁnd that in the UK ﬁrm-
sponsored training is less frequent in areas with higher local employment density.
Bassanini and Brunello (2008) ﬁnd that training is more frequent when the wage premium
is smaller; they argue that this result contrasts with Beckerian predictions but is not inconsistent
with training models with frictional labor markets. The aforementioned non-competitive mod-
els of training assume that the difference between productivity and wages is increasing with
training: this is conﬁrmed by the empirical evidence in Gerﬁn (2004). Barron et al. (1999) ﬁnd
a large impact of training on ﬁrm’s productivity growth and an extremely small impact of train-
ing on wages. They claim that this suggests that ﬁrms pay most of the cost and reap most of the
returns to training. Finally, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) empirically tested some implications
of their theoretical training model with asymmetric information, ﬁnding support from the data.
3 Firm-sponsored training
The data we use in our empirical investigation are gathered by Statistics Netherlands at the
level of both workers and ﬁrms. We use information about ﬁrm-sponsored training at the level
of ﬁrms, i.e. whether or not ﬁrms participated in training of their workers, and if so how much
money was spent on this.3 The ﬁrm data are also used both to compute the product market
competition index at the 3-digit SIC industry level and to infer its impact on ﬁrm-sponsored
training. The ﬁrm data come from the 2000-2005 waves of the Industry Production Survey
(PS). All the Dutch manufacturing ﬁrms with 20 or more employees are in the PS data. Units
smaller than 20 employees are instead representatively drawn from the corresponding census
population. We focus on ﬁrms larger than 20 employees. About 7,000 such ﬁrms are surveyed
each year, which results in about 35,000 observations in the period 2001-2005. We lose indeed
one time period, as the market imperfection indexes enter the reduced form model for training
with a lag of order one. We deleted observations with missing values for some variables used in
theeconometricanalysisandweretainedﬁrmswithmultipletimeobservations. Thisresultsina
unbalancedpanel made upof26,707 observationsforthetime period2001-2005, corresponding
to 6,647 different ﬁrms. Appendix A provides more details on our data, including sample
characteristics.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on ﬁrm-sponsored training by year over the time-
window used in the econometric analysis. The fraction of ﬁrms providing training to their
employees has monotonically decreased from 2001 until 2005, going from more than 76% in
2001 to 57.7% in 2005. The average expenditure on training has displayed a similar pattern
over time, from e260 in 2001 to e207 in 2005 per unit of labor. The decreasing proﬁle of train-
ing investments is however essentially related to the decline in the fraction of ﬁrms investing in
training. If we look at the expenditure in training conditional on sponsoring training, we can
3Statistics Netherlands reports statistical information on training of workers only on a irregular basis. The two
most recent surveys on ﬁrm-sponsored training are from 1999 and 2005.
5Table 1: Sample characteristics and summary statistics, 2000–2005
Firm data Worker data Industry data
Training Gross Elapsed job Labor market frictions Proﬁt
Fraction Expenditures hourly duration    elasticity
(%) (e) wage (e) (years) *0.01 *0.01
2000 – – 15.89 12.6 0.4 0.94 0.47 7.53
2001 76.2 260 15.85 12.6 0.39 0.93 0.48 7.52
2002 66.0 237 15.81 12.7 0.41 0.97 0.48 7.71
2003 62.6 213 15.97 12.7 0.44 0.96 0.48 7.89
2004 59.6 194 16.08 12.8 0.47 0.84 0.49 7.82
2005 57.7 207 16.09 13.1 0.51 0.72 0.49 8.48
Overall 63.5 220 15.95 12.8 0.44 0.89 0.48 7.82
Std.Dev. 48.1 470 6.52 10.4 0.22 0.71 0.13 5.87
Minimum 0 0 6.52 0.0 0.02 0 0.28 0.69
Maximum 100 25350 46.33 51.2 1 17.71 2.28 66.7
Observations 26,707 2,327,036 492
Note: Hourly gross wages are in real terms in 2005 prices (CPI in 2005=100); Labor market frictions:  =
index,  = monthly job offer arrival rate,  = monthly job destruction rate.
Table 2: Characteristics ﬁrm-sponsored training
Variables – Quartiles 0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
Number of employees [20-35] (35-54] (54-108] > 108
Fraction of ﬁrms sponsoring training (%) 49.6 55.1 65.9 84.7
Expenditure on training per unit of labor (e) 150 166 217 349
Temporary work agency costs (e1,000) [0-1] (1-66] (66-315] > 315
Fraction of ﬁrms sponsoring training (%) 72.5 64.7 68.6 79.3
Expenditure on training per unit of labor (e) 209 186 233 324
R&D (e1000) 0 (0-3] > 3
Fraction of ﬁrms sponsoring training (%) 57.2 75.7 80.5
Expenditure on training per unit of labor (e) 187 159 325
Note: Average 2001–2005.
see a different scenario: the conditional average expenditure in training has slightly increased
over time, going from e340 in 2001 to e360 in 2005.
Table 2 provides some characteristics of ﬁrm-sponsored training in our sample. As said, par-
ticipation in training increases with ﬁrm size from 49.6% in small ﬁrms to 84.7% in large ﬁrms;
expenditures show a similar pattern. Firm-sponsored training does not seem to be correlated
with expenditures on temporary work agencies, while there is positive relationship between
expenditures on R&D and ﬁrm-sponsored training. Whereas 57.2% of ﬁrms with no R&D ex-
penditures participates in training, 80.5% of the ﬁrms with more than e3000 R&D expenditures
participates in training. This suggests some complementarities between R&D and employers’
propensity to invest in training.
The labor market friction index is based on worker data, which are from the 2000–2005
6waves of the SSB Jobs (Social Statistical Database of Jobs). They contain information on
all the employees working in the Netherlands including sector, job starting and termination
dates, monthly wage, and working hours. Since the paper focuses on manufacturing ﬁrms, we
retained only employees that in each cross-section work in the manufacturing industry. Then,
we retained individuals between 15 and 65 years of age and we deleted observations lying
in the ﬁrst and last percentiles of the wage or working hour distributions. We end up with
yearly cross-sections of about 340,000-400,000 individuals each. Concise summary statistics
on hourly wages and job durations are reported in Table 1. Real hourly wages do not change
much over time, while average job duration does not show much variation either. Appendix B-1
clariﬁes in detail how we exploit the information on wages and job durations to estimate the
labor market friction index, also reported in Table 1.
4 Market imperfections
This paper is aimed at understanding the effect of market imperfections on ﬁrm-sponsored train-
ing. We deﬁne both labor market and product market on the level of the 3-digit SIC industry
classiﬁcation. Whereas for product markets the industry classiﬁcation is rather straightforward,
for labor markets the issue of market deﬁnition is more complex. One practical reason for our
choice is that the labor market deﬁnition should be such that it is possible to match the estimated
measure from worker data with ﬁrm data: the ﬁrm data we have can only be stratiﬁed according
to industry and not according to occupation, education, or area of residence.4
In order to approximate labor market imperfections, we estimate an index of labor market
frictions based on the rate at which job opportunities arise as a fraction of the rate at which they
are needed.5 If  is the employees’ job offer arrival rate and  is the job destruction rate, the





and takes therefore value on [0;1]. If no jobs are destroyed there are no labor market frictions;
if no job offers arrive there are maximum frictions in the labor market. The frictional index is
supposed to capture those mobility costs, information asymmetries, institutions, product market
turbulence, and labor market congestions that make difﬁcult or unlikely for a worker to move to
another job or to receive interesting wage offers from other ﬁrms. Hence, the higher the value
of frictional index  in a market, the higher ﬁrms’ willingness to sponsor training.
The labor market friction parameters are estimated separately per each 3-digit manufactur-
4Moreover, our simplifying assumption for the operational deﬁnition of labor market is consistent with the fact
that workers more often stay within the same sector than, for instance, within the same occupation (Bontemps et
al., 2000).
5This labor market friction index has been proposed by Ridder and van den Berg (2003). See also van den Berg
and van Vuuren (2005) for an empirical application.
7ing sector and per each time period of the window 2000–2005. Columns 5 to 7 of Table 1
reports the corresponding summary statistics (the details of estimation procedure are presented
in Appendix B-1). The monthly job offer arrival rate  increases until 2002, when it reaches
its maximum average value (0.0097), and then declines gradually up to 0.0072 in 2005. The
monthly job destruction rate  does not display much time-variation on average and ranges be-
tween 0.0047 and 0.0049. The frictional index  is almost monotonically increasing over the
period under study and reveals that, in the manufacturing industry, the average labor market
friction has increased, going from about 0.40 in 2000 up to 0.51 in 2005.
There is substantial variation in  over time and across sectors. The scatter diagrams in
the top of Figure 1 show the cross-sector variation by plotting the fraction of ﬁrms investing in
training (left panel) or the average expenditure on training (right panel) in each 3-digit sector
and the average labor market friction. There is a lot of variation in both the labor market
friction index as well as in the investments in training. However, no clear pattern between
ﬁrm-sponsored training and labor market frictions seems to emerge from raw data and across
sectors.
The indicator for product market competition is also estimated separately per each 3-digit
manufacturing sector and per each time period of the window 2000–2005. The product market
competition index used in this paper is the one proposed by Boone et al. (2009): the proﬁt
elasticity (PE). In words, PE is the percentage variation in proﬁts due to a percentage increase
in marginal costs. The last column of Table 1 reports the corresponding summary statistics (the
details of estimation procedure are presented in Appendix B-2). We ﬁnd that, overall, PE is of
about 7.8 on average: a 1% increase in costs leads to a 7.8% reduction in proﬁts. This is very
much in line with the estimation results in Boone et al. (2009). It can also be noted that PE has
increased over time, meaning that in the Netherlands competition in manufacturing has become
tougher on average. There is substantial variation in PE. There are sectors where the PE is lower
than 1 and sectors in which proﬁts are more than halved by a one percent increase in costs. As
for the estimates of the labor market friction index, the bottom graphs of Figure 1 shows no
discernible pattern across sectors between ﬁrm-sponsored training and proﬁt elasticity.6
The market imperfections measures estimated in this section point out that in the period
2000–2005 the Dutch manufacturing industry has become more competitive on the product
market side and characterized by an higher degree of frictions on the labor market side. This
is a scenario that is compatible, for example, with the case in which the domestic product
competition has become tougher, maybe because of less strict barrier policies, whilst labor
market friction has increased as a consequence of the exits of the least efﬁcient ﬁrms (lower job
offer arrival rate and higher job destruction rate). The correlation between the product market
competition indicator and the index for labor market frictions is weak, about 0.19. The scatter
6There is a lot of variation in the proﬁt elasticity with clear outliers. In a sensitivity analysis we will investigate
whether it matters to exclude the outliers.
8Figure 1: Market imperfections and Firm-Sponsored Training across 3-digit SIC industries
a. Labor market frictions – 
Fraction of ﬁrms investing in training Expenditures in training
b. Product market competition – PE
Fraction of ﬁrms investing in training Expenditures in training
9Figure 2: Product market competition and labor market frictions
plot in Figure 2 shows indeed no particular relationship between the two indicators.7
5 Econometric modeling and estimation results
5.1 Our model
As discussed in Section 3, a large part of the ﬁrms in our sample do not sponsor training.
Hence, our dependent variable is partly continuous with a positive and large probability mass
at zero investments in training. When modeling such a response variable, it has to be taken into
account the presence of a corner solution outcome. Usual linear estimators are indeed generally
inconsistentifappliedeithertotheentiresampleortothesampleforwhichtheoutcomevariable
is strictly positive.
Denote by yit ﬁrm i’s investment in training per unit of labor at time t. The corner solution









7Other factors might explain the time-variation of the labor market frictions index: e.g. ignorance among
workers about labor market opportunities, individual heterogeneity in preferences over jobs, and mobility costs
(Manning, 2003, § 13.1).
10where xit is a set of ﬁrm characteristics controlling for ﬁrm heterogeneity and including the
market imperfection indexes (stratiﬁed at 3-digit SIC industry level), ci is the ﬁrm effect, ct is
the calendar year effect, uit is the error term, and  is the vector of unknown parameters. The
calendar year effects are included to account for cyclical variation in ﬁrm-sponsored training,
which may be due to variation in resources or labor turnover. In recession ﬁrms may face
tighter resources, and in recessions there is less worker mobility and therefore less need for
training of new workers. The market imperfection index enters the training equation with a lag
of order one. We are implicitly assuming that the timing of events is as follows: i) ﬁrst, the
ﬁrm management observes the situation and the development of the market during the current
year; ii) second, it reacts accordingly by planning the workforce training investment for the next
period.8
From the data we observe (yit;xit). In the benchmark model we impose parametric as-
sumptions on the distributions of ci and uit. The former is such that it allows for dependence
between ci and xi = (x0
i1;:::;x0
iT)0. More in detail, we use a Mundlak (1978) version of Cham-
berlain’s (1984) approach. Correlation between ci and xi is allowed by adopting a correlated
random-effects speciﬁcation:
ci =  + x
0




where xi is the time average of xit and  is an unknown vector of parameters. The error term ui
is assumed to be normally distributed N(0;) and independent on (xi;ci). Then, model (2)-(3)
can be rewritten as
yit = max(0;x
0
it +  + x
0
i + ai + ct + uit) (6)
and estimated using a pooled tobit maximum likelihood approach to allow arbitrary serial cor-






























where  = (;ct;0;0;v)0 is the parameter vector to be estimated and  and  denote, re-
spectively, the CDF and the PDF of the standard normal distribution.
8See Section 5.3 for a sensitivity analysis that is conducted by including among the regressors also the contem-
poraneous value of the market imperfection index. It yields that the strict exogeneity of the market imperfection
indexes seems to be supported by the data.
9All the parameters will be then scaled by a factor (1 + 2
a) 1=2. Average partial effects will be however
consistently estimated by the scaled parameters.
11The vector xit contains, apart from the market imperfection indexes, a set of covariates
aimed at controlling for observable heterogeneity at ﬁrm level that might be correlated to train-
ing intensity and to the sectoral market imperfection index. We try to use all the information in
the dataset that could capture heterogeneous time variation of ﬁrm structure, organization, man-
agement, adoption of technical change, and productivity: value added, ﬁrm size, grants, sales,
investments in machine and equipment, buildings and lands, R&D, labor costs, expenditure on
temporary work agencies, advertising costs, communication costs, patent costs, energy costs,
industry indicators at 2-digit SIC level, and time dummies.10
5.2 The estimation results
Table 3 reports estimation results of the model in which both the labor market friction and
the product market power indexes are included in the training equation. Columns (5) and (6)
focus on the unobserved effects tobit model in equation (7) which is the benchmark estimation
techniques. Columns (1) and (2) refer to a linear model that ignores both the presence of corner
solutions and correlated random effects. Columns (3) and (4) refer to a pooled tobit model that
ignores the presence of the correlated random effects.
Table 3 shows that the estimation results are similar across different estimation techniques.
Moving from POLS to pooled tobit estimation, we take into account of the corner solution out-
comes at the cost of imposing the normality assumption on the training intensity distribution.
The effect of the labor market friction indicator is barely signiﬁcant. If frictions increase by
10%, the probability that ﬁrms sponsor some training increases by 0.4 percentage points and
the investment intensity on training increases by 1.2%. When the presence of correlated random
effects is taken into account, we get effects of friction on ﬁrm-sponsored training that are sig-
niﬁcant at 5% and slightly bigger in size. A 10% increase in frictions generates a 0.5 percentage
points increase of the probability of ﬁrms of deciding to invest in training and a 1.5% increase
in training expenditures. Note that a Wald test for signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients of the linear
approximation of the ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity largely rejects the null hypothesis. Per-
forming the analysis without the time-average of the covariates would generate biased results
due to their correlation with unobserved heterogeneity.
The effect of product market competition is small and insigniﬁcant. This result is in line
with the ﬁndings in Görlitz and Stiebale (2008). They studied the impact of different measures
of product market competition on the ﬁrm’s number of trained employees in Germany. We used
a more robust measure of product market competition and a ﬁner measure of ﬁrms’ investment
in training. As in Görlitz and Stiebale (2008), we ended up however with results that does not
strongly support the theoretical predictions of Gersbach and Schmutzler (2006).
10Banking costs, outsourcing costs, and proﬁts were preliminary included as additional regressors, but, since
always not signiﬁcant, removed from the training equation.
12Table3: Estimationresults: theeffectofmarketimperfectionsonﬁrm-sponsored
training
POLS Pooled Tobit Unobserved Effects Tobit
Coeff. S.E.(a) Coeff. S.E.(a) Coeff. S.E.(a)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a. Baseline estimates
Ln labor market friction index: lnit 1 .042** .018 .062* .032 .072** .036
Ln product market competition index: lnPEit 1 -.020 .022 -.026 .037 -.040 .027
Partial effects and elasticities at sample means
@P(yit > 0jxit;ci)=@ lnit 1 – – .040* .021 .047** .024
@E(yitjxit;ci;yit > 0)=@ lnit 1 – – .023* .012 .027** .014
@E(yitjxit;ci)=@ lnit 1 – – .033* .017 .038** .019
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci;yit > 0)=@ lnit 1 – – .046* .024 .054** .027
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci)=@ lnit 1 – – .123* .064 .143* .073
@P(yit > 0jxit;ci)=@ lnPEit 1 – – -.017 .024 -.026 .018
@E(yitjxit;ci;yit > 0)=@ lnPEit 1 – – -.010 .014 -.015 .010
@E(yitjxit;ci)=@ lnPEit 1 – – -.013 .019 -.021 .014
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci;yit > 0)=@ lnPEit 1 – – -.019 .028 -.030 .020
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci)=@ lnPEit 1 – – -.051 .072 -.079 .054
H0:  = 0 – – 2=, p-val=.000
Log-likelihood – -22580.5 -22454.0
R-squared .052 .038 .044
b  – .618 .614
Notes: 26,707 observations; * signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at 1% level. All the
covariates listed in Table A-1 are included in the model speciﬁcation. POLS stands for pooled ordinary least squares.
(a) Standard errors are adjusted by clustering at the 3-digit SIC industry level to take into account intra-industry corre-
lation.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
To investigate the robustness of our parameter estimates we perform a number of sensitivity
analyses, starting with a investigation of strict exogeneity of the market imperfections indica-
tors. The estimation method we have used so far hinges on the strict exogeneity of the market
indexes conditional on ﬁrm unobserved effects. This is a strong assumption, which rules out
the possibility that a shock in training for ﬁrm i in period t might have an effect on the mar-
ket structure in terms of ﬁrms’ monopsony power or of ﬁrms’ product market power. We test
whether this situation is empirically relevant here by using the strict exogeneity test proposed
by Wooldridge (2002, § 15.8.2) for discrete response panel data models. We add the contem-
poraneous values of the market imperfection indexes as additional regressors. Under the null
hypothesis, the contemporaneous market imperfection indexes should be insigniﬁcant. Fully
robust signiﬁcance tests return a p-value equal to 0.712 for the signiﬁcance of the contempo-
raneous labor market friction index and to 0.216 for the signiﬁcance of the contemporaneous
product market power index.11 Thereby, we cannot conﬁdently reject the null hypothesis, sup-
porting the strict exogeneity assumption.
Our second sensitivity analysis concerns the parametric restrictions of the model deﬁned in
(2) and (3). Parametric and semiparametric methods can be used to deal with the presence of the
11A fully robust joint signiﬁcance test returns a p-value equal to 0.291.
13ﬁxed effects ui in this non-linear framework.12 In the benchmark model, we used a Mundlak
(1978) version of Chamberlain’s (1984) approach: a parametric approach that imposes some
restrictions on the distribution of ci, which does not exclude dependence between xi and ci.
The advantage of this model is that it allows estimation of the parameters and of a set of other
quantities of interest from the policy perspective, like marginal effects of covariates. However,
there is no guarantee that the parametric restrictions hold. The main goal of semiparametric
methods is to construct estimators under more general assumptions. We test now the robustness
oftheresultstotoostrictparametricassumptionsbyimplementingthesemiparametricestimator
for censored regression panel data models with ﬁxed effects introduced by Honoré (1992).
Take t = 1;2 and deﬁne xi = xi2   xi1. If ui1 and ui2 are iid conditional on (xi1;xi2;ci),
(y
i1;y
i2)j(xi1;xi2) is symmetric around the 45°-line through (x0
i;0). Honoré noticed that the
symmetry is not affected by the censoring, so it holds also for the observed variables (yi1;yi2).
The symmetry can be exploited to derive orthogonality conditions that must hold at the true pa-
rameter values without the need for assumptions on the distributions of the ﬁxed effects or error
terms. Honoré derives two moments restrictions on the basis of which he proposes two estima-
tors. We use Honoré’s second estimator, since the corresponding objective function has some
smoothness properties that makes it straightforward estimation and inference.13 The vector of
coefﬁcients  enters the objective function through (xi2 xi1)0, meaning that estimation hinges
on time-variation: the coefﬁcients of time-invariant variables are not identiﬁed. Moreover, the
estimation of the marginal effects is not addressed in Honoré.
Table 4 displays Honoré estimation results of the coefﬁcients of market imperfections.
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation results of the model that comprises all the time-
varying variables used in the benchmark speciﬁcation. In columns (3) and (4), covariates that
are jointly and separately insigniﬁcant are removed from the set of regressors.14 The estimates
for the friction indicator are similar to those in the benchmark model. The estimates for the
product market competition index display instead an unexpected positive sign. However, as
in the benchmark model, they are not signiﬁcantly different zero. This evidence assesses the
robustness of the results obtained under stricter parametric assumptions on the ﬁxed effects and
error terms.
As a third sensitivity analysis we estimate a model in which the job offer arrival rate , the
job destruction rate , and their squares are included separately among the regressors, instead
of only by way of ln and deﬁnition in (1). Both  and  can be viewed as separate measures
12See Charlier et al. (2000) for a comparison between parametric and semiparametric estimators for censored
regression panel data model with ﬁxed effects.
13There are other strategies to construct more efﬁcient estimators than this Honoré estimator. See Charlier et al.
(2000). It is beyond the scope of this subsection to implement the most efﬁcient estimator. It is aimed at testing
the robustness of the benchmark model to parametric assumptions. Thereby, we will limit this sensitivity analysis
to Honoré’s estimator with t = 2004;2005.
14The variables that are jointly and separately insigniﬁcant are value added, investments in machine and equip-
ment, R&D, temporary work agency costs, advertising costs, communication costs, patent costs, and the time
dummy.
14Table 4: Sensitivity of the results to parametric assumptions: Honoré esti-
mates
Full set of covariates Only jointly signiﬁcant covariates
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln labor market friction index: lnit 1 .036 .031 .055* .033
Ln product market competition index: PEit 1 .012 .016 .014 .016
Notes: 10,936 observations; fraction of censored observations = 0.590; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis ﬁrm-sponsored training: alter-
native measures of market imperfections; unobserved ef-
fects tobit model
a. Labor market imperfections Coeff. S.E.(a)
Job offer arrival rate: it 1 -5.083*** 1.903
2
it 1 32.909** 12.961
Job destruction rate: it 1 -64.687** 31.051
2
it 1 2477.320 1525.278
Elasticities at sample means
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci;yit > 0)=@ lnit 1 -.033*** .012
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci;yit > 0)=@ lnit 1 -.247** .123
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci)=@ lnit 1 -.087*** .032
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci)=@ lnit 1 -.654** .323





b. Product market imperfections – PCM
lnPCMit 1 .077 .055
Elasticities at sample means
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci;yit > 0)=@ lnPCMit 1 .058 .043
@ lnE(yitjxit;ci)=@ lnPCMit 1 .154 .113





Notes: 26,707 observations; * signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level;
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level. All the covariates listed in Table A-1 are included in
the model speciﬁcation. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering at the 3-digit SIC
industry level to take into account intra-industry correlation.
15of labor market frictions. The former is the rate at which new job opportunities are received by
employees and therefore could capture mobility costs, vacancy availability, ﬁrm’s propensity to
poach employees. The latter is the rate at which job destructions occur and is therefore linked
to the state of the economy and to the labor market institutions on dismissals and ﬁring costs.
The top part of Table 5 reports the estimation results. It is noted that the estimated effects have
the expected sign: an increase either in the job offer arrival rate or in the job destruction rate
has a negative effect with decreasing returns, ceteris paribus, on ﬁrm-sponsored training. Even
if the coefﬁcient of the squared job offer arrival rate is signiﬁcantly positive, note that only less
than one percent of the observations would lie on the increasing part of the training-job offer
arrival rate quadratic function. For the average ﬁrm, a 10% increase in the job offer arrival rate
generates a 0.9% reduction in ﬁrm-sponsored training and a 10% increase in the job destruction
rate generates a 6.5% reduction in ﬁrm-sponsored training. Most of the effect of labor market
frictions on training that we saw in Section 5 seems therefore to derive from the job destruction
rate rather than the job offer arrival rate.15
Inafourthrobustnesscheck, weinvestigatedhowsensitiveourmainresultsaretoalternative
speciﬁcations of product market competition. We replicate the analysis of the benchmark model
by substituting the price cost margin (PCM) for the PE in the training equation.16 The lower
part of Table 5 shows that the PCM has indeed a positive effect on ﬁrm-sponsored training.
However, the estimated coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcantly different from zero, which is very much
in line with those obtained using PE as index of product market competition. In this application
the chosen method to measure product market competition does not affect the conclusions.
Finally, we check the sensitivity analysis of our results to outliers and to too restrictive func-
tional forms of the market imperfection indexes. In the former check, we replicated the analysis
by dropping from the sample ﬁrms belonging to the sector of iron and steel. In this sector PE
is indeed much higher (look at panel b of Figure 1) and it might be that the corresponding ob-
servations are inﬂuential in determining the results. We found that the results are not sensitive
to outlying observations. In the latter check, we changed the model speciﬁcation and instead
of log-linear functional forms for the market imperfection indexes we adopted log-quadratic
functional forms or continuous spline functional forms (with knots at several percentiles of the
market imperfection indexes). Once again, we found results that are very much in line with
those of the benchmark model.
15We also used a quadratic speciﬁcation of the relation between marginal costs and marginal proﬁts in model
(B-4). Then the PE varies with marginal costs. The parameter estimates relating PE with ﬁrm-sponsored training
were in line with those of the benchmark model.
16The PCM as a market measure of competition is usually calculated as market aggregate proﬁts over market
aggregate revenues. A large PCM indicates large opportunities of proﬁts and, therefore, a highly concentrated
industry. The closer the PCM is to zero, the more competitive the industry.
165.4 The quantitative importance of market imperfections
This subsection assesses the quantitative importance of labor market imperfections as deter-
minants of ﬁrms’ expenditure on training. This is done by estimating average partial effects
(APEs) induced by changes in the magnitude of the labor market imperfection indicators: we
compare predicted and counterfactual training expenditures at the sample means of the covari-
ates as suggested by Wooldridge (2002, § 16.8.2).
On the basis of the estimation results of the benchmark model, we estimate the following
APEs:
i) The average change in expenditures and in the fraction of ﬁrms investing in training if all
the sectors were characterized by low labor market frictions. We pick  to be equal to
the minimum observed over the sample period.17 Thereby, we mimic the ﬁrm-sponsored
training implications of an economy-wide increase in labor market ﬂexibility to the level
of the most ﬂexible labor market. It is found that an economy-wide move to a very ﬂexible
labor market would reduce ﬁrms’ expenditures in training by 36% (e96 per unit of labor)
and the fraction of ﬁrms investing in training by 13.4%.
ii) The average change in expenditures and in the fraction of ﬁrms investing in training if,
in every sector, there were one more job offer per unit of job destruction. In this case
expenditure on training decreases by 4.8% (e12.9 per unit of labor) and the fraction of
ﬁrms investing in training decreases by 1.6%
iii) The average change in expenditures and in the fraction of ﬁrms investing in training if the
labor market frictions decreased by one standard deviation. Expenditure in training would
decrease by 5.4% (e14.6 per unit of labor) and the fraction of ﬁrms investing in training
would decrease by 1.8%.
6 Conclusions
Investments in training of workers are important for individual ﬁrms because they stimulate
productivity of workers and competitiveness of ﬁrms. The extent to which training of workers
is important differs between ﬁrms. Some ﬁrms may chose to hire less skilled workers and invest
in training of these workers while other ﬁrms prefer to hire more skilled workers and provide
less training. The importance of workers’ training goes beyond individual ﬁrms as training
may facilitate sectoral adjustment and stimulate growth nationwide. Investment in training may
be affected by market imperfections. Indeed, recent human capital theories predict that labor
market frictions and product market competition inﬂuence ﬁrm-sponsored training.
Our paper investigates how market imperfections affect ﬁrms’ propensity to sponsor train-
ing. We use Dutch data covering the census population of manufacturing ﬁrms with more than
17The lowest level of labor market frictions is registered in 2001 in the manufacture of games and toys.
1720 employees and the census population of workers. We ﬁrst compute two indexes of labor
market friction and product market competition at 3-digit SIC industry level. Then, we recover
the causal effect of both type of market imperfections on ﬁrm-sponsored training. We ﬁnd that
a decrease in labor market frictions signiﬁcantly reduces ﬁrms’ training expenditures. From a
sensitivity analysis it appears that this is largely driven by the effect of a change in job destruc-
tion. Clearly, if the job destruction rate goes up investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc training go down
because of the reduction in the period over which investments are paid-back. Instead, product
market competition does not have an effect on ﬁrm-sponsored training. From this we conclude
that increasing competition through international integration and globalization does not pose a
threat to investments in on-the-job training. An increase in labor market ﬂexibility may reduce
incentives of ﬁrms to invest in training, but the magnitude of this effect is small.
Appendix A Details on the data
ThePSdataprovidedetailedanddisaggregatedinformationonturnover, value-added, personnel
costs, investments, number of employees, industry classiﬁcation, and other ﬁrms and industry
characteristics. Table A-1 displays summary statistics of the key variables used in the analysis.
The dependent variable is the costs sustained by the ﬁrm for studying and training of their
employees per unit of labor.18 A large fraction of ﬁrms do not sponsor at all training and,
overall, the fraction of observations with some training is equal to 63.7%. The important mass
of observations at zero training costs calls for econometric models properly accounting for
the presence of corner solution outcomes (see Section 5). The investment in training per unit
of labor is equal to e220 on average and ranges to a maximum of e25,350. The average
training costs per unit of labor conditional on sponsoring training is instead equal to e345. The
average ﬁrm size is about 104 employees for an average wage cost of more than e4 million.
More than half of the observations in the sample are concentrated in 4 sectors: manufacture
of food and beverage products (SIC-15), of fabricated metal products (SIC-28), of machinery
and equipment (SIC-29), and publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (SIC-
22). The others are scattered over the other 2-digit manufacturing industries. The rest of the
listed variables (e.g. R&D, advertising costs, communication costs, and costs of patents) enter
the speciﬁcation of the econometric models and try to capture ﬁrm heterogeneity, both time-
constant and time-varying. They are aimed at approximating heterogeneity in ﬁrm organization
structures and manager qualities, so as to remove spurious correlation between the error term
and the market imperfections industry indicators.
18The costs for studying and training are normalized by the number of full time equivalent employees.
18Table A-1: Sample Characteristics of Manufacturing Firms
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Fraction of ﬁrms sponsoring training 0.635 0.481 0 1
Expenditure on training per unit of labour (e1,000) 0.220 0.470 0.000 25.350
Expenditure on training per unit of labour (e1,000) 0.345 0.550 0.004 25.350
conditional on sponsoring training
Number of employees 103.80 476.34 20 32076
Wage cost (e1,000) 4057.0 21097.9 3.000 1424916
Cost of temporary work agencies (e1,000) 474.41 2469.00 0 159014
Value added (e1,000,000) 8.410 48.721 -1926.90 2302.30
Operating income: total net sales (1,000,000e) 36.480 24.288 0.200 12801.68
Received refunds and grants (e1,000) 131.56 2425.31 -79 163384
Costs of buildings and lands (e1,000) 482.18 2732.56 0 165342
Costs of equipment and machines (e1,000) 625.90 4497.70 0 384028
R&D (e1,000) 371.33 18207.9 0 1860300
Advertising costs (e1,000) 319.35 2428.97 0 98603
Communication costs (e1,000) 86.15 471.99 0 30426
Costs of patent and licensing rights (e1,000) 208.37 4124.28 0 244369
Cost of energy (e1,000) 798.15 9193.62 0 436737
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation 1993 (2-digit)
SIC-15 0.133 0.340 0 1
SIC-16 0.002 0.046 0 1
SIC-17 0.027 0.163 0 1
SIC-18 0.006 0.080 0 1
SIC-19 0.004 0.061 0 1
SIC-20 0.034 0.182 0 1
SIC-21 0.033 0.178 0 1
SIC-22 0.099 0.299 0 1
SIC-23 0.003 0.054 0 1
SIC-24 0.054 0.227 0 1
SIC-25 0.056 0.230 0 1
SIC-26 0.043 0.202 0 1
SIC-27 0.014 0.117 0 1
SIC-28 0.172 0.377 0 1
SIC-29 0.147 0.354 0 1
SIC-30 0.003 0.057 0 1
SIC-31 0.024 0.155 0 1
SIC-32 0.008 0.088 0 1
SIC-33 0.030 0.170 0 1
SIC-34 0.026 0.158 0 1
SIC-35 0.026 0.160 0 1
SIC-36 0.055 0.227 0 1
Time dummies
2001 0.204 0.403 0 1
2002 0.150 0.357 0 1
2003 0.211 0.408 0 1
2004 0.214 0.410 0 1
2005 0.221 0.415 0 1
Observations 26707
Notes: Pooled data for the PS waves (2001–2005).
(a) Training per unit oflabor is deﬁned as the expenditures on trainingper full-time equivalent employee.
19Appendix B Measuring market imperfections
B-1 Labor market frictions
The labor market friction index is estimated by using Ridder and van den Berg’s (2003) condi-
tional inference approach. We exploit the information contained in the waves of the SBB Jobs
data on the joint distribution of elapsed job durations and wages among currently employed
workers.19
Consider a standard partial on-the-job search model (e.g. Mortensen, 1986) where ﬁrms do
not post wages under the reservation wage. In steady-state, the following relation can be derived







where G is the cross-section cdf of wages and F is the underlining cdf of offered wages. Within
each market and for each year in the time window 2000–2005, we non-parametrically estimate







where 1() is the indicator function and N is the total number of employees in the market and
year under consideration. In such framework, the job exit rate is [1   F(w)] +  and the
contribution to the likelihood function of individual i with job tenure ti given the wage wi is
Li = f + [1   F(wi)]gexpf ti[ + [1   F(wi)]g: (B-2)
Exploiting relation (B-1), the likelihood function can be expressed in terms of b G, , and . Es-
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19Ridder and van den Berg (2003) also propose an unconditional indicator of labor market frictions, which is
more robust from the theoretical viewpoint and focuses on the duration dependence pattern of the job exit rate due
to unobserved heterogeneity. However, this unconditional indicator is less robust from an econometric point of
view.
20See, e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for the derivation of equation (B-1) within an equilibrium search
model with on-the-job search, random matching, and wage posting.
20B-2 Product market competition
The product market competition index used in this paper is the PE. The PE is more robust as an
indicator for product market competition than for example the PCM.21 Consider the case, for
instance, when ﬁrms in a given sector start behaving more aggressively. This might result in
inefﬁcient ﬁrms being forced out of the market and in a bigger market share for the survivors. In
suchahypotheticalsituationcharacterizedbyanincreasedcompetitionduetoamoreaggressive
ﬁrm conduct, the PCM would wrongly indicate less intense competition. The PE avoids such
pitfalls since it is not based on proﬁts and costs levels. Rather, it looks at the marginal variation
in proﬁts caused by a marginal variation in costs per unit of output. If this relation becomes
steeper over time, competition has become more intense. The underlining idea, based on the
theoretical work in Boone (2008), is that in more competitive markets ﬁrms are punished more
harshly in terms of proﬁts for being inefﬁcient.
The computation of the PE for each 3-digit SIC industry follows Boone et al. (2009) and is
based on the estimation by ordinary least squares (OLS) of the following equation





where it, cit, and rit are respectively proﬁts, costs, and revenues of ﬁrm i at time t, i and t
are ﬁrm and time ﬁxed effects, "it is the error term. The coefﬁcient t is the percentage increase
in proﬁts due to a percentage increase of costs per unit of revenues, cit=rit, which is our mea-
sure of product market competition.22 Boone et al. (2009) show under which assumptions an
increase (decrease) of t over time can be safely interpreted as more (less) intense competition
in the corresponding industry. It is precisely the time-variation of this index that will convey
information to identify the impact of PE on ﬁrm-sponsored training in an unobserved effects
econometric framework.
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